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Introduction
The Eurozone crisis and the subsequent overhaul of the European Union’s (EU)
system of economic governance have granted greater authority to EU institutions,
especially in the area of policy implementation (Bauer and Becker, 2014; da
Conceic¸a˜o-Heldt, 2016). The European Commission now plays a central role in
the European Semester, the EU’s annual economic and ﬁscal policy coordination
cycle. As ﬁscal and economic supervisor, the Commission wields signiﬁcant discre-
tion in assessing imbalances in member states’ budgets and economies, and issues
Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations (CSRs) to address the risks stemming from
these imbalances for the wider EU economy (Armstrong, 2013; Scharpf, 2015;
Seikel, 2016). CSRs drafted by the Commission must be endorsed by the
Council, but the scope for amendment is restricted as this requires a qualiﬁed
majority of votes (QMV) and is subject to the so-called ‘comply or explain’ prin-
ciple. Both the scope and substance of EU interference in national economies and
budgets have been heavily criticised for the strong focus on social retrenchment, or
austerity, over social investment (e.g. Blyth, 2013), or ‘capacitating social policies
[. . .] that aim to maximise the returns on social expenditures in the form of active
employment and social participation’ (Kersbergen et al., 2014).
More fundamentally, the legitimacy of this system of economic governance and
the issuing of CSRs is further complicated by a context of tangible politicisation of
European integration: ‘the growing salience of European governance, involving a
polarisation of opinion, and an expansion of actors and audiences engaged in
monitoring EU aﬀairs’ (De Wilde et al., 2016: 4). European integration in
general has gradually become a key issue in political conﬂicts along a transnational
cleavage structure (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). This has, in turn, been integrated
into existing national political conﬂict structures in country- and time-speciﬁc
ways, and conﬂicts over the EU may ﬂare up when politicised by domestic
actors (Kriesi, 2016). Domestic political parties, especially the Eurosceptic extreme
left and right, now explicitly proﬁle on EU issues (Meijers, 2017; Meijers and Rauh,
2016). Citizens more deliberately vote for parties with strong pro- or anti-EU
platforms and voice concerns over further integration in referendums
(e.g. Brexit). The crisis has in itself also increased the salience of EU economic
governance and eroded trust in EU institutions, further fuelling support for
Eurosceptic parties (Baglioni and Hurrelmann, 2016; Hobolt and De Vries,
2016). Overall, the economic crisis has greatly increased the visibility of the EU,
and the legitimacy of its system of economic governance is strongly contested.
The Semester thus tasks a powerful but politically conscious Commission with
issuing sensitive recommendations to member state governments, while the role of
the EU in the lives of its citizens is frequently questioned and politicised by domes-
tic-level actors. Despite this, research has paid little attention to the consequences
of such moments of ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2009) for the
functioning of EU economic governance. Academic scholarship on the Semester
has mostly focussed on the Semester’s (im)balance between social and economic
objectives (Azzopardi-Muscat et al., 2015; Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2018),
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its capacity for policy learning (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2016; Zeitlin, 2016) and the
implementation of CSRs by member states (Deroose and Griesse, 2014).
Only Baerg and Hallerberg (2016) have studied the political determinants of
CSR amendments in the Council, ﬁnding that political power and public
Euroscepticism are strong determinants of successful weakening by member
states of recommendations in the Council. Moreover, there are only a few studies
on the inﬂuence of the politicisation of European integration on speciﬁc EU policy
areas (e.g. see Rauh, 2016), and none on the stage of the implementation of com-
munity policy by EU actors. Our study contributes to the literature on economic
governance by extending the focus to include the eﬀects of politicisation and
domestic politics on the supranational implementation of community policy.
Simultaneously, it responds to calls in the literature on the politicisation of
European integration and on public support for the EU to extend the treatment
of these phenomena from dependent to explanatory variables, in order to uncover
how they might act as constraints on European governance, and with what
consequences for the eﬃciency and legitimacy of the EU (Hobolt and De Vries,
2016; Zu¨rn, 2016).
We draw on theories of bureaucratic responsiveness to risk and stakeholder
preferences to pull these literature streams together and examine the extent to
which the politicisation of European integration (hereafter: ‘politicisation’)
aﬀects the way the Commission interprets its mandate as macroeconomic
supervisor. Using data on all CSRs formulated by the Commission since the
introduction of the Semester in 2011, we reveal a positive relationship between a
member state’s level of politicisation and the scope of recommendations
targeting that country as formulated by the Commission. We also ﬁnd that
politicisation aﬀects these recommendations in more substantive terms, with
higher levels of country-speciﬁc politicisation resulting in fewer CSRs that advo-
cate social investment. Here, we have purposefully only analysed Commission
behaviour in the form of the CSRs proposed. As noted earlier, these may still
be amended by the Council, but our analysis does not extend to CSRs in the
form they are ﬁnally issued to national governments (cf. Baerg and Hallerberg,
2016).
The Commission as a responsive regulator:
Risk and reputation
European economic integration has always been a story of mutual gains through
increased cooperation, although stronger interdependence also increases cross-
border economic risks. A common currency reduces cross-border trade barriers,
but also creates new risks for member states as they lose the ability to adjust their
exchange rates to protect their economies (Lane, 2012). The Semester grants the
Commission a number of policy tools to regulate cross-border ﬁscal and economic
risks, of which the CSRs are a comprehensive output that streamlines recommen-
dations stemming from diﬀerent measures into a single country-speciﬁc document.
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Risk management by national regulators has been well studied, and the resulting
theories oﬀer insights into the way regulatory agencies employ their discretion
during policy implementation to respond to external pressures (Alon-Barkat and
Gilad, 2016; Black and Baldwin, 2012; Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter and Krause,
2012; Gilad, 2012, 2015; Jennings, 2009; Maor, 2011; Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan,
2016; Rothstein, 2006; Rothstein et al., 2006). A central tenet of these theories is
that regulators aiming to manage the ever-growing number of risks to society face
institutional risks as a by-product of their eﬀorts. Issues rarely ﬁt the regulatory
frameworks that these actors develop, and regulators are dependent on complex
institutional regimes making success diﬃcult to achieve. Consequently, regulators
have only a limited impact on the management of societal risks, and ‘the diﬃculty
in satisfying conﬂicting demands on regulation, therefore, creates institutional risks
that can threaten the legitimacy of regulatory organisations and their practices
(Rothstein et al., 2006: 95).
Regulators employ various risk-management strategies depending on which type
of risk they perceive to be the most threatening. Those mostly concerned with soci-
etal risk simply make decisions by weighing the impacts of societal risks against
the likelihood that they occur (Black and Baldwin, 2012). For example, ﬁnancial
regulators will weigh up the societal impact of the insolvency of major ﬁnancial
intermediaries against the likelihood that such insolvency occurs, and then direct
attention and resources accordingly. In other situations, they may be more concerned
with institutional risks. These are speciﬁc risks to the institutional position of
the regulator, rather than to society, and stem from developments that may
weaken a regulator’s future institutional position (Gilad, 2012). By signalling incom-
petence, regulatory failure may ultimately weaken an actor’s institutional position.
Similarly, regulators that ignore the preferences of their institutional overseers may
face institutional repercussions. Consequently, institutional risk-sensitive regulators
will prioritise tasks and allocate resources to mitigate such institutional risks which
are inherent to the job of regulating risks to society (Rothstein, 2006).
In safeguarding its institutional position, a regulator’s reputation is a vital asset.
Stronger reputations result in greater discretion and autonomy (Carpenter and
Krause, 2012), whereas a poor regulatory reputation may lead to a repeal of
delegated competences or budget cuts. However, this regulatory reputation
depends largely on the audience who, through interaction with the regulator,
constructs it (Carpenter, 2010). It is the audience’s assessment of a regulator’s eﬃcacy,
expertise and legitimacy that shapes the regulator’s reputation. Reputation-sensitive
regulators will seek to safeguard and enhance this audience’s positive judgement, and
the (un)responsiveness to external signals will be guided by the regulator’s institutio-
nalised organisational identity (Gilad, 2015). Recent research into how regulators
cope with reputational threats, and the institutional risk they face as a result of
these, has found that they are responsive to public allegations of regulatory failure
(Maor et al., 2013), public opposition (Alon-Barkat and Gilad, 2016; Jennings, 2009),
political intervention (Gilad, 2015) and media attention (Maor and Sulitzeanu-
Kenan, 2016).
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In line with this, we would expect politicisation to be an institutional risk that
warrants a response, i.e. a visible shift in the risk management strategy of a com-
petence-seeking Commission. As politicisation increases the visibility of the
Commission’s behaviour and broadens its audiences, it eﬀectively moves the imple-
mentation of community policy from ‘business as usual’ to ‘implementation under
pressure’. When the level of politicisation is low, we would expect the Commission
to be chieﬂy concerned with managing economic and ﬁscal (i.e. societal) risks.
As politicisation increases, we would expect the Commission’s sensitivity to insti-
tutional risks, and thus to external signals, to increase. Two previous studies that
have investigated this relationship oﬀer support to this notion in that they found
that politicisation can aﬀect the way individual Commission oﬃcials conceive the
role of their institution in the wider process of European integration (Bes, 2017)
and may lead the Commission to be responsive to a broader set of societal
stakeholders when drafting EU policy (Rauh, 2016).
This leads us to our ﬁrst, and central, expectation: that higher levels of domestic
politicisation, and the institutional risks they pose, aﬀect the Commission’s behav-
iour as economic supervisor. When politicisation is low, the Commission is likely to
use the CSRs in line with their original intention – as tools to manage the economic
and ﬁscal risks in individual member states. As levels of country-speciﬁc politicisa-
tion increase, the Commission will seek to preserve its regulatory reputation by
signalling key audiences, thus visibly diﬀerentiating in its treatment of member
states where levels of politicisation are higher. Societal risk remains a key driver
in CSR formulation, but institutional risk management is now of primary concern.
Despite their heuristic value, theories of risk responsiveness fail to oﬀer context-
speciﬁc hypotheses. Nevertheless, we can argue that politicisation may make it
more diﬃcult for the Commission to bolster its reputation as its legitimacy has
traditionally been output-based (Schmidt, 2013) and it has to constantly reinterpret
its mandate according to signals from key stakeholders (Rauh, 2016). The unique
character of the Semester also creates additional institutional risks since the
Commission issues invasive recommendations to the very entities that collectively
decide its future institutional position. Not only may the Council collectively decide
to repeal competences, but individual regulatees may also seek opt-outs from
Commission supervision. Politicisation increases the likelihood of such undermin-
ing of the Commission’s authority, not least because transfers of authority to the
EU are a primary cause of the politicisation of European integration, with
Eurosceptic actors being keen to reframe such transfers as ‘losses of sovereignty’
(Grande and Hutter, 2016).
In formulating observable implications for strategic Commission behaviour, we
follow Rauh’s (2016) approach and identify the key stakeholders, or audiences,
that observe the Commission as it issues CSRs. The Semester has two categories of
stakeholders: endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous stakeholders are the individ-
ual member state governments, i.e. the recipients of CSRs, and the Council, that is
the member state governments collectively, from which the Commission receives its
mandate to issue CSRs. These stakeholders are already involved structurally in the
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process leading up to the issuing of CSRs, with numerous points of interaction
between the Commission, member state governments and the Council. However,
when country-speciﬁc levels of politicisation change, so will the internal dynamics
of the Semester, and the signals received by the Commission. For example, as
Baerg and Hallerberg (2016) argue, country-speciﬁc increases in Euroscepticism
strengthen the bargaining positions of national government vis-a`-vis the
Commission during CSR adoption in the Council.
Exogenous stakeholders, or the wider audiences that observe the Commission’s
actions in EU economic governance, are ‘the people’ and ‘the markets’ (Schmidt,
2014; Streeck, 2014). The ‘people’ consist of national and European electorates,
interest groups and civil society, a public which is mostly fragmented along national
borders. Together with national political parties, the ‘people’ form the locus where
politicisation occurs: it is to this audience that Commission action has become more
salient, and its response has been to polarise and mobilise. The ‘markets’ comprise
globally operating actors, such as investors, pension funds, traders and bankers.
This audience is predominantly concerned with economic and ﬁscal risks in
member states: it seeks economic stability, as epitomised in the economic agendas
of austerity and market deregulation, and the continuation of economic growth.
Under ‘business as usual’, a Commission focus on economic risk will appease the
‘markets’ and leave the ‘people’ indiﬀerent. However, as country-speciﬁc levels of
politicisation increase, the ‘people’ will increasingly gain clout as a stakeholder in the
implementation of community policy – increasing the pressure on the Commission to
limit the unpopular austerity measures and create more widely dispersed social
and economic beneﬁts (Rauh, 2016). Given these divergent preferences, increasing
politicisation implies that it is becoming extremely diﬃcult for the Commission to
simultaneously appease the ‘people’ and calm the ‘markets’.
Here, we propose two sets of competing hypotheses for Commission responsive-
ness to increasing levels of country- and time-speciﬁc politicisation, and by exten-
sion to institutional risk, that address both the scope and the substance of the
CSRs proposed by the Commission. The ﬁrst set assumes a Commission that is
mainly concerned with mitigating domestic public opposition to EU (economic)
governance. Seeking to appease the ‘people’, we assume the Commission to avoid
purposefully fuelling further politicisation in its member states. Here, we would
ﬁrst expect the Commission to minimise the scope of its recommendations, as fewer
recommendations imply less European interference in a country’s domestic aﬀairs.
Second, when CSRs are issued, we predict a larger relative share to recommend
social investment, as opposed to unpopular austerity measures or social retrench-
ment, in countries with relatively high levels of politicisation.
H1a: Member states with higher levels of domestic politicisation will receive fewer
CSRs from the Commission.
H1b: The CSRs received by member states with higher levels of domestic politi-
cisation will contain a higher proportion of recommendations for social
investment.
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The second set of hypotheses assumes a Commission that is also concerned with the
institutional risk posed to itself by politicisation and responds by ‘entrenching’.
Since regulatory favouritism will harm the Commission’s reputation as a credible
ﬁscal and economic watchdog, it may anticipate and avoid the political and eco-
nomic backlash that might result from giving into politicised member states.
Instead, in order to secure its reputation as an unwavering ‘guardian of the mar-
kets’, it may seek to send a strong signal of regulatory resolve, and independence
from political inﬂuence, to other member states, the Council and the ‘markets’.
An important aspect is that the Commission still speaks to the ‘people’ of other
member states, i.e. signalling to German voters that it is not favouring Spanish
voters or vice versa. We expect this scenario to have two observable implications.
First, because successfully signalling regulatory commitment to economic objectives
and political independence necessarily implies sending a strong signal, we expect the
Commission to issue more recommendations in response to country- and time-speciﬁc
increases in politicisation. Substantively, we expect an ‘entrenched’ Commission to
‘retreat’ to a position where its mandate is strongest in order to signal regulatory
competence. Three features of CSRs suggest that entrenchment will reduce the
relative share of CSRs recommending social investment issued to politicised
member states (cf. Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2018). These are: that recommendations
on economic and ﬁscal objectives enjoy a stronger legal basis; that they stem from
explicit procedures (the Macroeconomic Imbalance and Excessive Deﬁcit Procedures)
underpinned by detailed protocols; and that they are backed up by the possibility of
sanctions. While individual regulatees may object if the Commission signals resolve
too strongly, a simultaneous entrenchment towards a stronger mandate can shield it
from such a critique.
H2a: Member states with higher levels of domestic politicisation will receive more
CSRs from the Commission.
H2b: The CSRs received by member states with higher levels of domestic politi-
cisation will contain a lower proportion of recommendations for social
investment.
Data and methods
We test these hypotheses using an original data set of CSRs formulated by the
Commission containing data for 27 member states over the period 2011–2017. We
analyse CSRs as formulated by the Commission before the Council has had the
opportunity to alter or adopt them. Greece is not included as it was subject to
Macroeconomic Adjustment Programmes (MAPs) for the entire observed period
and did not receive any CSRs.1 Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and Romania
were subject to MAPs for one or more years and therefore did not receive CSRs in
these years. These and other missing values were handled through listwise deletion.
The ﬁnal sample contained 169 observations (country-years).
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Our ﬁrst outcome variable, the scope of CSRs, is measured as the number of
words used in formulating the substantive recommendations. This measure more
adequately captures the scope of CSRs than simple recommendation counts since
both the ‘number and level of detail of the recommendations reﬂect the scale of the
challenges each Member State faces’ (European Commission, 2015). In this, we
only ‘captured’ the CSRs themselves, and excluded the background and rationales
provided in CSR documentation. We use a natural log transformed metric to
reduce positive skew and high-end outliers, and aid interpretation (Gelman and
Hill, 2007).
We use topic modelling, speciﬁcally latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), to
estimate the policy topics that most prominently feature in individual recommen-
dations, adhering to the numbering in CSR documentation. As a class of Bayesian
generative models, LDA models assume documents consist of multiple topics, and
assume the terms in these documents to be a function of the presence or absence of
a given topic (Blei, 2012; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). After estimating the optimal
number of topics, extracting and qualitatively validating them, we then identify
those topics for which the CSRs speciﬁcally and explicitly recommend social invest-
ment over social retrenchment. Our second outcome variable captures the propor-
tion of ‘social’ topics in the average recommendation in a given country-year (see
the Online appendix for details).
All predictor variables that follow are lagged: that is, they are measured three to
eight months before the Commission formulates CSRs.2 This lag ensures that
our predictors precede our outcome. Given the diﬃculties of constructing
country-speciﬁc measures for salience and mobilisation, we operationalise our
main predictor, politicisation, as the level of polarisation in citizen’s opinions on
the EU. Following Rauh (2016), we measure polarisation as the kurtosis of
the distribution of citizen opinions on the EU, as calculated from the weighted
individual-level responses to the Autumn Eurobarometer item: ‘In general, does the
EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or
very negative image?’. Kurtosis is a measure of the ‘heaviness’ of the tails of the
distribution of opinions: lower values indicate more observations are further from
the mean and thus indicate stronger polarisation.3
As politicisation requires active political entrepreneurs who successfully mobil-
ise the public on salient constitutive issues and a polarised public opinion (Hooghe
and Marks, 2018; Hutter et al., 2016), we also include a dichotomous variable that
captures whether a member state’s political system includes a successful
Eurosceptic challenger party that holds one or more seats in parliament. We
used the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify political parties
scoring below four on a seven-point pro-integration scale (Bakker et al., 2015).
Ray (2007) showed that parties scoring below four in the CHES data could be
classiﬁed as either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ Eurosceptic and we followed this reasoning.
The diﬀerentiated political power of member states has always been an import-
ant factor in EU decision making, and this aﬀects a member state’s chances
of having CSRs weakened in the Council (e.g. Baerg and Hallerberg, 2016;
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Ha¨ge, 2013; Mattila and Lane, 2001; Tsebelis, 2013). We measured political power
as the voting power of a member state in the Council, using the Shapley-Shubik
index of power distribution under the Nice rules for 2011–2013 and under the
Lisbon rules for 2014–2017. These indices are based on the probability that a
member state is pivotal in turning a losing coalition into a winning one and are
widely used in the literature on legislative bargaining (Hix and Høyland, 2011).
Croatia is not included in the index, meaning that a country’s estimated power may
be slightly diﬀerent to their true power in the period 2014–2017.
We rely on the main scoreboard indicators of the Macroeconomic Imbalance
Procedure (MIP) to identify the main reason why the Commission would have
formulated CSRs, i.e. the level of economic and ﬁscal risk in a member state.
Each indicator is accompanied by an indicative threshold, which serves the
Commission as a heuristic device to detect possible imbalances. For each indicator,
we create a dichotomous measure that indicates whether a member state is in
breach of the indicative threshold in a given year.4 We acknowledge that, in prac-
tice, the formulation of CSRs is a highly complex and interactive process that
necessarily requires a sophisticated reading of the scoreboard indicators, and
that they are by no means applied mechanistically (European Commission,
2016). Nor is it our intention to outguess the Commission’s assessment of
these imbalances. Nevertheless, given the complexities of numerically assessing
the economic or ﬁscal stance of a country, relying on breaches of these thresholds
provides us with the most valid control variables possible, and covers the full
breadth of ﬁscal and economic imbalances. The data for these indicators are
taken from Eurostat. At the time of writing, data for indicators on private sector
debt, credit ﬂow and ﬁnancial sector liabilities were not available for 2016.
To prevent a total rejection of all 2017 observations, these indicators were not
included in the models. We include a ﬁnal dichotomous measure for a country’s
membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), since membership
creates additional interdependencies between and additional obligations for
member states and increases their exposure to imbalances in other EMU countries.
Finally, we control for three additional political factors that may inﬂuence the
Commission’s formulation of recommendations. First, if the Commission is
responsive to polarisation, it may also be sensitive to the electoral cycle in a
given member state. We therefore measure the closeness of elections as the
number of months until the next election from the month in which CSRs are
published. Further, the formulation of CSRs by the Commission may be aﬀected
by whether a member state’s government is economically left- or right-oriented,
and whether it is opposed to or supportive of European integration. We capture the
former by taking the governing party’s position on a 10-point left–right scale from
the parliaments and governments database (ParlGov) by Do¨ring and Manow
(2016) and create a weighted measure for coalition governments. We use the
same approach to measure government positions on European integration using
the seven-point anti-pro integration scale from the 2014 CHES item mentioned
earlier. A complete overview of predictors, including the MIP indicators and their
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indicative thresholds, and descriptive statistics is provided in the Online appendix.
Moreover, all predictor variables are grand-mean centred to aid interpretability,
and the continuous predictor variables are standardised by two standard devi-
ations, placing them on a scale that is eﬀectively bound between zero and one
(Enders and Toﬁghi, 2007; Gelman and Hill, 2007).
We employ a series of ﬁxed slope, random intercept multilevel models that
account for the nested and cross-classiﬁed nature of the data (Schmidt-Catran
and Fairbrother, 2016). Models with the preﬁx A use the log-transformed word
count as an outcome, whereas models with preﬁx B indicate models that instead use
the proportion of CSRs advocating social investment. In all cases, model 0 is the
baseline model. Model 1 predicts the outcome using the MIP indicators, EMU
membership and political power. Following this, model 2 subsequently introduces
our main predictors of interest related to the politicisation of European integration.
Model 3 adds the remaining political control variables. These ﬁnal models are
speciﬁed as follows:
yijk ¼ jk þ 01Political poweri þ 02EMUmembershipi þ 03MIP1i þ   
þ 12MIP10i þ 13Polarisationi þ 14Electioni þ 15Govt: anti-proEUi
þ 16Govt: left-righti þ "i
and:
jk ¼ 00 þU0j þU0k þ 0j þ 0k
where yijk is the outcome for the ith observation; the intercept jk is allowed to vary
by country j and by year k.
The intraclass correlation coeﬃcients (ICCs) derived from the null models stat-
istically support the use of cross-classiﬁed multilevel models as 83.7% of the total
variance in the scope of CSRs stems from diﬀerences between countries (31.4%) or
years (52.3%).5 For the models predicting the proportion of ‘social’ CSRs, 25.2%
of the total variance stems from diﬀerences between countries, and none from
diﬀerences between years. Table 1 presents the model ﬁt statistics for the
speciﬁed models. The v2 tests indicate that the ﬁt signiﬁcantly increases from
model A0 to model A1, and that model A2 only marginally fails to cross conven-
tional signiﬁcance thresholds (p¼ 0.058). The same applies to model B1 (p¼ 0.059),
which is not surprising given that many MIP indicators fail to cover imbalances
that are directly related to recommendations on social investment. The ﬁt signiﬁ-
cantly improves by adding politicisation in model B2. Adding the remaining pol-
itical control variables (in models A3 and B3) did not improve the ﬁt for either
outcome variable. For both outcomes, collinearity issues between indicators of
youth and long-term unemployment rates warranted the exclusion of the latter
(r¼ 0.719).6 No modelling assumptions were violated in any of the models pre-
sented below.
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Results
Table 2 shows the estimation results when using the scope of the CSRs issued by
the Commission as the outcome variable. As the outcome variable is measured on a
log scale, the coeﬃcient estimates indicate the multiplicative change in the scope of
CSRs for a one-unit change in a predictor while all other predictors remain at their
grand means. Standard errors for the estimates are given in parentheses.
Exponentiated coeﬃcients are provided for the ﬁnal model (A4) to aid substantive
interpretation.
Our results support H2a, and by extension fail to support H1a, in that member
states with higher domestic levels of polarisation do receive more CSRs from the
Commission. That is, the Commission issues more recommendations to member
states who have higher levels of politicisation. Holding all the other predictors at
their grand mean values, a one-unit increase in the kurtosis of the distribution of
citizen opinions on the EU, which implies a signiﬁcantly more consensual view of
the EU, is associated with a 16.5% decrease in the scope of the CSRs. This change
is equivalent to the diﬀerence in country means between France (0.46) and Malta
(0.25). As such, the Commission is responsive to polarisation when it drafts CSRs
and increases the scope of its recommendations when faced with more polarised
public opinions of the EU. However, the presence of a Eurosceptic challenger party
in a national parliament does not aﬀect the scope of CSRs.
Adding the political control variables to the model yields additional interesting
results. First, the measure for the political power of a member state oﬀers a reliable
estimate that indicates that politically more powerful member states receive more
recommendations. A one-unit increase in voting power is related to a 32.1%
increase in the scope of CSRs proposed by the Commission. This change in pol-
itical power in the Council is roughly comparable to the diﬀerence between Malta
Table 1. Model fit statistics.
Degrees of
freedom
Akaike information
Criterion (AIC) Log-likelihood Deviance v2 Pr(v2)
(A0) 4 170.073 81.063 162.073
(A1) 16 127.468 47.734 95.468 66.605 1.375e-09***
(A2) 18 125.770 44.885 89.770 5.698 0.058
(A3) 21 125.663 41.832 83.663 6.107 0.107
(B0) 4 293.958 150.979 301.96
(B1) 16 290.441 161.220 322.44 20.483 0.059
(B2) 18 293.428 164.714 329.43 6.987 0.030*
(B3) 21 291.395 166.697 333.39 3.667 0.265
Note: N¼ 169; J¼ 26; K¼ 7.
*p< 0.05. **p< 0.01. ***p< 0.001.
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Table 2. Multilevel models for the scope of Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs).
(A0) (A1) (A2) (A3) Exp(A4)
(Intercept) 5.469*** 5.487*** 5.280*** 5.287*** 197.733
(0.216) (0.187) (0.203) (0.203)
Political power 0.311*** 0.288** 0.278** 1.321
(0.093) (0.089) (0.085)
Economic and 0.098 0.091 0.034 1.034
monetary union (0.094) (0.090) (0.090)
Net international 0.480*** 0.537*** 0.588*** 1.801
investment position (0.096) (0.095) (0.095)
Gross govt. debt 0.385*** 0.357*** 0.386*** 1.472
(0.090) (0.088) (0.086)
Unemployment rate 0.216** 0.183* 0.168* 1.182
(0.072) (0.072) (0.073)
Youth unemployment rate 0.042 0.045 0.062 1.064
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
Export market shares 0.151* 0.116 0.120 1.127
(0.072) (0.071) (0.070)
Current account 0.103 0.125* 0.136* 0.873
(0.064) (0.063) (0.062)
Activity rate 0.141 0.137 0.142 1.152
(0.077) (0.076) (0.075)
Unit labour cost 0.120 0.108 0.094 1.099
(0.080) (0.080) (0.079)
House Price Index 0.055 0.052 0.046 0.955
(0.073) (0.073) (0.072)
Real effective exchange rate 0.078 0.049 0.057 1.059
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072)
Kurtosis (polarisation) 0.181* 0.180* 0.835
(0.075) (0.073)
Euroscepticism 0.021 0.002 0.998
Nat. Parliament (0.097) (0.096)
Election 0.014 1.014
(0.044)
Govt. pos. anti-pro 0.101 1.106
European Union (EU) (0.062)
Govt. pos. left–right 0.087 0.917
(0.054)
(continued)
12 European Union Politics 0(0)
(2016 population: 420,000) and Poland (2016 population: 38,627,000). Second,
neither the domestic electoral cycle nor the government’s position on the EU
and its economic preferences inﬂuence the quantity of recommendations they
receive from the Commission. These ﬁndings are robust under varying model spe-
ciﬁcations, including those that include the originally omitted MIP scoreboard
indicators for 2011–2016. They are also in line with those of Baerg and
Hallerberg (2016) who found that Euroscepticism and political power signiﬁcantly
aﬀect CSR amendments, but found no relationship between amendments and the
remaining political measures.
CSRs are formally meant to address economic and ﬁscal imbalances in member
states, and a number of the estimates for theMIP scoreboard indicators support this
notion. Member states in breach of the indicative threshold for net international
investment position (NIIP), which are in eﬀect in debt to other EU member states,
receive 80.1% more recommendations from the Commission. Similarly, member
state governments with a gross debt exceeding 60% of gross domestic product
(GDP) can expect a 47.2% increase in the number of issued recommendations.
Further, member states exceeding the unemployment rate threshold receive 18.2%
more recommendations. Surprisingly, member states experiencing current account
imbalances receive 12.7% fewer recommendations. Breaches of the indicative
thresholds for the other scoreboard indicators do not appear to lead to more, or
fewer, recommendations. Finally, additional obligations and interdependencies
resulting from Eurozone membership have no observable eﬀect on CSR issuance.
Given these ﬁndings, it is clear that the management of cross-border risks to other
EU member states, and to the wider EU economy, is the dominant rationale behind
the Commission’s issuing of recommendations to member states.
Table 3 presents our second set of cross-classiﬁed models using the relative
proportion of recommendations advocating social investment against austerity or
Table 2. Continued.
(A0) (A1) (A2) (A3) Exp(A4)
Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC)
170.073 127.468 125.770 125.663
Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC)
182.593 177.546 182.108 191.391
Log likelihood 81.036 47.734 44.885 41.832
N 169 169 169 169
J 26 26 26 26
K 7 7 7 7
Var: Country (intercept) 0.167 0.043 0.036 0.031
Var: Year (intercept) 0.279 0.231 0.225 0.229
Var: Residual 0.087 0.067 0.067 0.065
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05.
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Table 3. Multilevel models for the share of recommendations on social investment.
(B0) (B1) (B2) (B3)
(Intercept) 0.217*** 0.220*** 0.284*** 0.280***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026)
Political power 0.025 0.026 0.030
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Economic and monetary union 0.021 0.018 0.010
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Net international investment position 0.051* 0.040 0.033
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Gross govt. debt 0.017 0.030 0.023
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Unemployment rate 0.013 0.005 0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Youth unemployment rate 0.024 0.022 0.030
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Export market shares 0.040* 0.031 0.034
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Current account 0.009 0.015 0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Activity rate 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Unit labour cost 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
House Price Index 0.048* 0.049* 0.049*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Real effective exchange rate 0.033 0.022 0.033
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Kurtosis (polarisation) 0.056** 0.054*
(0.021) (0.021)
Euroscepticism Nat. Parliament 0.034 0.036
(0.026) (0.026)
Election 0.022
(0.015)
Govt. pos. anti-pro European Union (EU) 0.005
(0.019)
Govt. pos. left–right 0.025
(0.017)
(continued)
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other measures as the outcome variable. Here, the results support H2b, that a
smaller share of the CSRs received by member states with higher domestic levels
of polarisation will recommend social investment. By extension, H1b is weakened,
given that the Commission does not issue more recommendations on social invest-
ment to member states with high levels of polarisation. Rather, a one-unit increase
in kurtosis, again indicating a more consensual public view of the EU, is associated
with a rise of 5.4 percentage points in the proportion of ‘social’ recommendations
when all other predictors are held at their grand means. The other political indi-
cators tested do not appear to have any meaningful relationship to the outcome of
interest here. In our ﬁnal model, only one MIP indicator is signiﬁcantly related to
the share of social recommendations: a breach of the indicative threshold for the
House Price Index is associated with a 4.9 percentage point decrease in the pro-
portion of recommendations advocating social investment. This ﬁnding is surpris-
ing, given that the proportion of recommendations related to social investment
tends not to be inﬂuenced by breaches of most of the MIP indicators. These
ﬁndings are robust for diﬀerent model speciﬁcations and varying demarcations
of the category for recommendations advocating ‘social investment’.
To summarise, our statistical evidence indicates that, typically, member states
receive more extensive recommendations from the Commission when: (a) their
domestic public opinion on the EU is more polarised; (b) they wield more political
power in the Council; (c) they are in breach of the indicative thresholds for the
NIIP, government debt or unemployment rate indicators; and/or (d) they are not
breaching the current account balance indicator. In terms of the substance of
CSRs, a smaller proportion of the recommendations that a member state receives
relate to social investment when domestic public opinion is more polarised or when
it is breaching the MIP indicator for the House Price Index. Although neither
model allows us to claim causality, there is some evidence against an endogeneity
bias that is that the characteristics of the recommendations emanating from
Table 3. Continued.
(B0) (B1) (B2) (B3)
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 293.958 290.441 293.428 291.395
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 281.438 240.362 237.090 225.667
Log likelihood 150.979 161.220 164.714 166.697
N 169 169 169 169
J 26 26 26 26
K 7 7 7 7
Var: Country (Intercept) 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
Var: Year (Intercept) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Var: Residual 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05.
van der Veer and Haverland 15
Brussels fuel further Euroscepticism amongst EU citizens. The fact that the annual
geometric means for the scope of CSRs rose steadily from 256 words in 2011 to 533
words by 2014, before dropping signiﬁcantly to 168 in 2015, while the annual
means for polarisation levels across the EU member states rose from 0.03 in
2011 to 0.24 in 2013, but began declining a year earlier – to 0.17 in 2014 and
0.04 in 2015 – runs counter to an endogeneity bias being present. In conclusion,
the evidence provided here oﬀers credibility to the argument that increasing pol-
iticisation inﬂuences the Commission’s application of economic and ﬁscal surveil-
lance measures.
Conclusions and discussion
In this study, we have investigated to what extent the politicisation of European
integration aﬀects the implementation of EU community policy. We have approached
this topic by examining the issuance of CSRs by the European Commission. We
argued that the Commission, while using CSRs to regulate the economic and ﬁscal
risks in EU member states, is also responsive to the institutional risks posed by the
politicisation within them when it interprets its mandate as the EU’s economic and
ﬁscal supervisor. Based on two possible alternative responses by the Commission to
this institutional risk, we oﬀered two sets of competing hypotheses that varied in terms
of the exogenous stakeholder, or audience, in whose eyes the Commission would be
keenest to preserve its reputation: ‘the people’ or ‘the markets’ (Schmidt, 2014;
Streeck, 2014). After controlling for the relevant sources of economic and ﬁscal imbal-
ances in member states, we have shown that the Commission issues more CSRs to
those member states where public opinion on the EU is more polarised. This ﬁnding
strongly contradicts H1a. We also found some evidence that the Commission issues
relatively few recommendations that advocate social investment to member states with
high levels of polarisation, which fails to support H1b. That is, recommendations
issued to member states with high levels of politicisation are less likely to urge
social investment. Both these ﬁndings indicate that the Commission does react to
higher levels of politicisation when it formulates and issues CSRs.
Moreover, our ﬁndings provide empirical support for both hypotheses H2a and
H2b, which anticipated that the Commission would act as the ‘guardian of the
markets’ in response to the institutional risk posed by politicisation at the domestic
level. While our results do not allow us to draw deﬁnite conclusions regarding the
intent behind this behaviour, we suggest that this response can best be explained as
a form of regulatory ‘entrenchment’. By increasing the scope of its CSRs for
countries with relatively high levels of politicisation, it sends a strong signal to
other observing audiences of its regulatory resolve and political independence
and reaﬃrms its reputation as a supranational ‘watchdog’ that remains determined
to execute the task it was delegated. Simultaneously, the Commission is also able to
entrench by issuing CSRs on those issues where it has a stronger mandate, which
explains the greater focus on economic and ﬁscal objectives rather than social
objectives for those member states where politicisation is higher.
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Our ﬁndings constitute important contributions to our understanding of the
workings of European economic governance. The EU’s system of economic gov-
ernance has never been a technocratic process in which rules were applied mech-
anistically, and political tinkering is often seen as a prerogative of member states
(Amtenbrink and De Haan, 2003; Bauer and Becker, 2014; Scharpf, 2015; Seikel,
2016). Our contribution has identiﬁed a key driver behind the use of discretion by
the European Commission, the main actor tasked with implementing these rules at
the EU level: the issuing of CSRs is a highly political process and, as such, is
susceptible to exogenous political forces. Our ﬁndings largely support those of
Baerg and Hallerberg (2016) and indicate that politicisation processes not only
aﬀect individual actors, but also aﬀect the wider inner workings of entire govern-
ance structures. Moreover, we have also shown that, in ‘speaking to the markets’
(Schmidt, 2014), European actors do not only rely on discourse and symbolic
gestures, they also instigate concrete action.
Finally, we show that politicisation does not only have major consequences for
the evident stages of policy formulation and legislative bargaining (Hoeglinger,
2016; Rauh, 2016; Wonka, 2016), but even aﬀects the executive activities of the
European Commission in its role as the EU’s economic and ﬁscal supervisor.
Our ﬁndings on the Commission’s ‘entrenchment’ tie in with those of Bes
(2017) and Rauh (2016), who both found a similar pattern of the Commission
‘entrenching’ behind a strong mandate. Bes (2017) found that increasing levels
of politicisation push Commission oﬃcials towards acting on their mandate as
a ‘supranational bureaucracy’ and becoming more pragmatic (and less policy
entrepreneurial) in conceiving their institutional role. Rauh (2016) found that,
under its mandate as the initiator of EU legislation on consumer policy, politi-
cisation pushes the Commission to be responsive to a broader set of societal
interests and hence to disperse societal policy outcomes that beneﬁt a broader
set of societal interests. In all these cases, ‘entrenchment’ may shield
the Commission from scrutiny and may prevent the further fuelling of political
conﬂict over EU issues at the domestic level.
Our ﬁndings are subject to a number of limitations. First, although we have
studied Commission behaviour, this is only the starting point as CSRs may later
be amended in the Council. Second, the management of economic and ﬁscal risks
posed to European societies remains the most important explanatory factor in
why the Commission issues CSRs, so the importance of the politicisation eﬀect
should not be overstated. We would also add that the insigniﬁcance of some of
the MIP scoreboard indicators should not be seen as implying that the
Commission is neglecting the economic dimension when implementing CSRs.
Properly assessing the economic and ﬁscal risks in EU member states is inﬁnitely
more qualitative and complex than simply counting the breaches of indicative
thresholds. In terms of capturing politicisation, we have focussed on polarisation
and largely ignored both salience and mobilisation, in part because measuring the
latter aspects across 27 EU member states is both diﬃcult and language-sensitive.
Our proxy for salience and mobilisation, i.e. the presence of a Eurosceptic
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challenger party, turned out to be a poor predictor of CSR characteristics, which
suggests that the presence of Eurosceptic parties in national parliaments does not
inﬂuence CSR formulation.
Lastly, and linking our ﬁndings to those of Baerg and Hallerberg (2016), an
alternative explanation for our results could be that the Commission increases the
scope of its CSRs for powerful and politicised member states in anticipation of
such countries diluting their recommendations in the Council. While our design
does not allow us to draw deﬁnite conclusions on the relative merits of these
competing explanations for our ﬁndings, we oﬀer three reasons why we believe
the ‘entrenchment’ argument put forward in this contribution is the more compel-
ling. First, Commission entrenchment could explain the responsiveness in terms of
both scope and substance, whereas Commission anticipation does not. Second, the
alternative explanation would suggest the presence of an interaction eﬀect between
the voting power and polarisation measures included in our analysis but, when
tested, this eﬀect was small and highly insigniﬁcant. Lastly, this alternative explan-
ation raises the problem of equiﬁnality: while the Commission may be anticipating
amendments in the Council, the Council may equally be weakening the
Commission’s signals of entrenched regulatory resolve during the amendment pro-
cess. Here, further research examining changes in inter-institutional dynamics
under increasing levels of politicisation should prove highly rewarding.
This study has provided initial evidence for the existence of a politicisation
eﬀect on the implementation of community policy in the EU and has shown
that the European Semester’s recommendations are not solely the product of
extensive and objective technical analysis. Grande and Kriesi (in Hutter et al.,
2016) observe that politicisation is driven by the strategic attempts to politicise
European integration and the EU by domestic political actors. Our contribution
extends this argument by showing that European actors are not necessarily
idle or passive subjects of politicisation, but that they actively develop coun-
ter-strategies to respond to developments in their political context. Whether such
strategies will ultimately strengthen or harm the EU’s ﬁckle legitimacy remains
to be seen.
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Notes
1. The absence of countries that were part of MAPs in the present analysis means our data
set is truncated in that it does not include cases that go beyond a certain severity of
economic or fiscal imbalance. This leads to an underestimation of the total variance and
of the model’s coefficient estimates. However, it would be wrong to include MAPs since
they differ significantly from CSRs in their bindingness, the way they are implemented
and the actors responsible for their enforcement (the ‘Troika’). As such, including coun-
tries under MAPs in the present analysis would severely limit the internal validity of the
analysis.
2. Except the predictor for the number of months until the next election.
3. We also measured polarisation as the overall variance of the responses to this item.
Both measures are highly correlated (r¼0.75) and our results are robust using either
measure.
4. Our reliance on dichotomous measures is necessary because some indicators have both
upper and lower thresholds and can take both positive and negative values.
5. Most of the temporal variance stems from a large drop in the average number of words
used to formulate CSRs from 2014 to 2015, which coincides with the change from the
Barroso II Commission to the Juncker Commission.
6. This choice did not affect model outcomes.
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